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Abstract 
In 1957, the Labour Party published radical proposals for a state earnings-related 
pension scheme (‘national superannuation’) whose funds were to be invested in stock 
markets to generate high returns, and to help modernize and dynamize the British 
economy. This article explores a sophisticated campaign against the proposal by the 
insurance industry, and the resistance of the unions. In doing so, it considers the 
implications of this cross-class alliance, not least in terms of a possible missed 
opportunity to build a ‘developmental state’ in the UK, but also in terms of the 
country’s increasingly inadequate and inequitable system of pension provision.  
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The 1950s was a period of unparalleled peace-time economic growth with Britain 
increasingly an ‘affluent society’ which in many respects really had ‘never had it so 
good’ as Harold Macmillan claimed in 1957. Yet, by the mid- to late-1950s what is 
sometimes called the ‘postwar settlement’ was already being called into question. 
Emerging evidence of Britain’s relatively poor economic performance gave rise to 
rising concern about the country’s apparent economic ‘decline’; concerns which, in the 
early-1960s led to what Samuel Brittan called ‘a great reappraisal’ and to attempts 
(ultimately failed) first by the Conservatives and then by Labour to create the 
‘developmental state’ that seemed to so many at the time to be essential to the 
revitalization of the British economy. 
2
 At the same time, there was also a growing 
feeling that the postwar welfare state had not entirely delivered the results expected of 
it. This concern was to reach its full flowering with the ‘rediscovery’ of poverty in 1965 
(following the publication of Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend’s landmark The 
poor and the poorest) but a decade earlier the plight of the aged poor, and the fact that 
those dependent on the state pension were falling behind their luckier counterparts with 
company pensions, was already creating pressure for a radical extension of the welfare 
state.
3
 In 1957 these twin pressures were effectively brought together when the Labour 
Party, then in opposition, published an unusually well-thought out and radical set of 
proposals for a state earnings-related pension scheme.
4
 Labour’s proposed system of 
‘national superannuation’ promised to provide workers with a pension equal to about 
half average earnings. It would embody an important element of redistribution between 
contributors: between higher- and lower-paid workers; and between the young and the 
old. But its most radical element was perhaps Labour’s intention to invest the very large 
funds that would accrue to the scheme in stock markets in order both to modernize the 
economy and to maximize returns. 
This was not just a key moment in the development of British pensions. Leslie Hannah 
has remarked that, with only a third of workers in occupational schemes, the mid- to 
late-1950s was probably the ‘last practical moment at which a state earnings related 
pension scheme could have wiped out the bulk of demand for private provision in 
Britain’.5 But Hannah’s use of the phrase ‘wiped out’ reminds us that it was also a key 
moment in the postwar development of British capitalism; for the political battle that 
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took place in the late-1950s over the best means of providing earnings-related pensions 
was at root also a battle over the ownership and control of a large slice of British 
capitalism. 
Ultimately, Labour’s radical plan fell victim to its defeat in the 1959 general election, 
though even before then it was clear that national superannuation was not going to be 
the vote winner that the party had anticipated. Instead, the much more limited 
‘graduated retirement pension’ was implemented by the Conservatives in 1961. This 
was a minimalist earnings-related top-up to the flat-rate basic state pension designed to 
be a ‘back-stop’ to voluntary provision. In conjunction with generous tax reliefs on 
contributions to private occupational pensions, it was deliberately calculated to ensure 
the continued growth of what Gordon Clark has termed ‘pension fund capitalism’.6 By 
1967, 12.2 million British workers were in occupational pension schemes, around half 
the workforce, and half as many again as had been in such schemes in 1956.
7
  
It is not surprising that the finance sector resisted Labour’s national superannuation 
plans, for they heralded the effective nationalization of the British life assurance 
industry and a considerable increase in the scope of public ownership and control of 
British industry and commerce more generally. More surprising, perhaps, is the 
resistance of organized labour to Labour’s attempt to extend the welfare state. 
Traditionally, so called ‘labourist’ explanations of welfare state development have 
emphasized the role of organized labour in the creation and subsequent expansion of 
welfare states.
8
 In the British context, for example, it has been seen as an important 
factor in early welfare reform, and as a significant contributor to the extension of the 
welfare state set in train by Beveridge in 1942.
9
 Critics have argued that the emphasis 
on organized labour is too narrow, noting for example that it was the Liberal rather than 
the Labour Party that ushered in British welfare reform after 1906. Ann Orloff, has 
emphasized the role played by inherited political institutions and processes.
10
 Others 
have seen cross-class coalitions as a key variable in explaining variations between 
countries in the form and extent of state welfare provision.
11
 There has, however, also 
been a growing recognition that cross-class alliances involving organized labour might 
also sometimes work against the expansion of welfare provision by the state. Thus, for 
example, a combination of wage controls in the second world war and tight labour 
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markets in the postwar ‘golden age’ is seen to have encouraged the development of 
‘private social benefits’ in a ‘divided welfare state’, particularly when it came to 
pensions in Britain and the USA.
12
 The argument is that in such conditions collective 
bargaining between trade unions and employers favoured the expansion of occupational 
pensions as a species of ‘deferred pay’. Indeed, trade unions and employers have been 
identified as remarkably important in the development of ‘pension fund capitalism’ and 
in resistance to state-run alternatives to private pension schemes.
13
 
In explaining the failure of Labour’s pension plan to capture the public imagination, 
this article will argue that there is actually little evidence of employers playing an 
active role in opposing the party’s proposals, other than their resistance to the idea that 
membership of national superannuation should be compulsory and that occupational 
pension rights should be transferable when a worker changed jobs. Rather, it finds 
evidence of a cross-class alliance between capital and labour in the sense of a 
correspondence between the interests of the life assurance sector and the unions when it 
came to pensions. It argues that a key role in the defeat of Labour’s proposals was 
played by a sophisticated lobbying operation undertaken by the life companies, which 
feared that national superannuation would mark the end of a lucrative and rapidly rising 
occupational pension scheme business.
14
 But an important part was also played by the 
trade unions, many of which actively opposed Labour’s plan. This essay, after briefly 
outlining Labour’s pension proposals, explores the reactions to them by these unlikely 
allies and the ways in which each sought to oppose key elements of national 
superannuation. It ends by considering the implications of this cross-class alliance 
between capital and labour for the country’s increasingly inadequate system of pension 
provision, but also in terms of a possible missed opportunity to build a ‘developmental 
state’ in the UK.15  
I 
Even at its inception, the state pension ushered in by the 1946 National Insurance Act 
was inadequate, Beveridge having lost his battle to have it set initially at a ‘subsistence’ 
rate (i.e. at a rate at which recipients could actually live on it alone).
16
 Postwar inflation 
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then served to make it more so for, despite the reluctant concession by the government 
of periodic rises, it fell below the rate of national assistance, a poverty benchmark.
17
 In 
an increasingly affluent society, the poverty of many old people was a growing 
embarrassment.  
Four basic options for remedying the situation presented themselves. Firstly, one could 
simply privatize pensions, allowing the growing number of occupational schemes to 
take up the slack. Whilst congenial to many Conservatives, however, the stumbling 
block here, as we shall see, was that the insurance companies were not enthusiastic 
about taking on a large number of unprofitable low-paid workers.  Alternatively, there 
was theoretically still scope for government to subsidize higher pensions from general 
taxation. However, two factors discouraged this. The Labour government’s decision in 
1946 to drop Beveridge’s 20-year build-up of pension rights meant that the Treasury 
became obsessed by the ‘growing army’ of workers who would be able to retire on a 
full pension from 1958 having paid only ten years contributions. Coupled with the 
Treasury’s persistent suspicion that spending on social security amounted to throwing 
‘money down the sink’, the result was that it worked tirelessly to contain spending on 
pensions so far as was possible.
18
 In addition, with taxes at an historically high level, 
there were worries about how the electorate would react to further rises and worries that 
the fiscal system as a whole was losing legitimacy.
19
 A third option was to improve the 
finances of the national insurance fund by raising the level of the flat-rate contribution. 
But flat-rate contributions were tied to the level that could be afforded by the poorest 
workers – ‘the Beveridge strait-jacket’.20 Which leads us to the fourth option, to break 
with the flat-rate principle. Given Labour’s ideological antipathy to the power of 
finance capital, its worries about the electorate’s appetite for higher taxation to fund 
welfare spending, and its concern to ensure that contributions were affordable by the 
poorest workers, it was this option that proved most attractive to the party. 
In May 1957, Labour published its proposals for national superannuation; what Richard 
Crossman, its political champion, tended to refer to as ‘half-pay-on-retirement’.21 
National Superannuation  was the product of an unprecedented use of academic 
advisers (Richard Titmuss, Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend from the LSE).
22
 It 
began with a perceptive analysis of ‘the case for change’. This rightly highlighted the 
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disappointment felt by those who had placed their faith in the ability of the flat-rate 
state pension to provide a subsistence pension for all. It noted that, although workers 
were generally doing well, ‘real poverty still exists among our old people’.23 It 
highlighted the increasing problem of ‘“two nations” in old age’ identified by Richard 
Titmuss, its principal architect – the gap opening up between a ‘privileged minority’ 
lucky enough to benefit from generous occupational pension schemes and the 
‘unprivileged majority’ who continued to be dependent on the state pension. But it also 
acknowledged that there appeared to be ‘a very real limit to the amount which the 
taxpayer – and that includes the working-class taxpayer – [wa]s prepared to pay in 
taxes’.24 The ‘only way forward’, argued Labour, was ‘an all-embracing system of 
national superannuation’ to extend the benefits of earnings-related occupational 
pensions to all; thus transforming ‘a minority privilege into a right available to every 
citizen’, and effectively legitimizing higher contributions by offering better pensions in 
return.
25
 After a 20-year transition period a worker earning around the national average 
with a full contribution record could expect a pension equivalent to about half their 
earnings at retirement.
26
  
The scheme that Labour proposed would not, however, be a mere copy of private 
occupational schemes. It would not be ‘actuarial’. Labour proposed to give it a socialist 
dimension by incorporating within it a floor below which no pension would be 
permitted to fall, thus providing an element of redistribution from high- to low-wage 
earners.
27
 Other important features were, firstly that pension rights would not be lost on 
a change of job, an important change that would increase job mobility.
28
 Secondly, the 
pension would be ‘dynamised’ in order to protect contributors against inflation: at the 
time of retirement the pension entitlement would be based upon an average lifetime 
salary calculated in real not nominal terms; and once in payment the pension would be 
linked to changes in a new cost of living index. These were benefits that private sector 
occupational schemes would struggle to match because it would be expensive to hedge 
against unknown inflation prospects over the long-term. This was entirely deliberate, 
for the genesis of national superannuation lay in the analysis of its academic architects 
that only by a significant decline in the provision of pensions by the private sector 
could the problem of ‘two nations in old age’ be solved.29  
The failure of ‘nationalization by attraction’  
 
6 
Perhaps the most revolutionary proposal arose, however, from the considerable fund 
that Labour envisaged building up to finance future pensions – something the Phillips 
Report had deemed ‘not practicable’ when it had considered the idea in 1954, arguing 
that ‘to mortgage so large a part of the national resources … would, on the whole, be 
injurious to the economy’.30 The advent of earnings related contributions would 
produce a substantial income (estimated to be just over £1.1bn per annum in its first 
year of operation). This was more than double the combined total of annual employee 
and employer contributions to public and private sector occupational pension schemes 
in 1956.
31
 Labour’s academic advisers estimated that, after allowing for the payment of 
pension benefits and assuming constant prices and productivity, this would produce a 
fund of about £800m in 1960, rising to £4.5bn in 1970 and £7.8bn in 1980. This very 
large fund (in 1956, when the estimate was made, UK GDP was about £20bn.) would 
be ‘boldly invested’ in equities to ‘help the country carry through the large-scale capital 
investment so essential if we are to continue to expand our exports and improve our 
living standards’. The scheme’s architects noted, however, that such ‘large-scale 
competition by the state in the field of investment will not be welcome in certain 
quarters’; and they sought to deal with such criticisms by proposing that the investment 
policy of the fund be controlled by trustees appointed by the government.
32
  
II 
Not surprisingly, Labour’s proposals were vigorously opposed by the life insurance 
industry. Shares of insurance companies fell when Labour’s plan was published as 
investors wondered if national superannuation might spell the end of private pensions.
33
 
As soon as they had got wind of Labour’s scheme, the Life Offices Association, the 
Associated Scottish Life Offices, and the British Insurance Association had begun to 
consult and to coordinate a response. Even before National superannuation was 
published, they were publicly raising questions about the impact of Labour’s proposals 
on existing occupational schemes, implying that its benefits would depend on the whim 
of the government of the day, asking what would be the impact on inflation, on savings, 
and on competitiveness, and noting that the scheme would mean the state ‘becoming a 
heavy investor in private industry.
34
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To help fight the idea of national superannuation, the Life Offices’ Association engaged 
the services of Notleys (its then advertising agency) to oversee a public relations 
campaign aimed at undermining the proposal.
35
 Within a month, the association had 
allocated £40,000 to finance a series of advertisements highlighting the importance of 
occupational pensions to British workers, and to fund the publication of a booklet 
arguing that any earnings-related state scheme could have a catastrophic impact on 
existing company schemes.
36
 On Labour’s rumoured intention to invest in stock 
markets the latter bluntly concluded that these funds could not ‘long remain free from 
political influence, or even direction’ and this would ‘lead to undue state control and, 
ultimately, full control of large sections of industry’.37 As the chief actuary of the 
Prudential Assurance Company privately put it to Crossman, the fund envisaged by 
Labour would be three times that of the Prudential, itself as great as all the funds of the 
other life companies put together; Labour would ‘own the country in ten years at that 
rate!’38 
By May 1957, the Life Offices’ Association and the Scottish Life Offices had set up a 
joint publicity committee to coordinate the PR campaign. Already, 60,000 copies of the 
LOA booklet had been sent to newspapers, political opinion formers, relevant 
government departments, employers’ associations, members of the TUC general 
council, and every company pension fund in the country. A further 20,000 were on 
order, and the LOA had authorized spending up to £70,000 on its campaign.
39
 A 
popular version of the LOA booklet was to be distributed to trade union members and 
to members of company pension funds.
40
 Then, in response to Labour’s publication 
National superannuation in May, the joint life offices issued a robust press release 
attacking its proposals – managing at once to argue that the forecast fund was unlikely 
to build up a fund ‘commensurate with its vast commitments’ and to warn that its 
investment in stocks and shares ‘would introduce a new and politically controversial 
factor into the field of pensions’.41  
One notes that early in its private deliberations the life offices’ joint publicity 
committee identified trade unionists as important allies in any campaign against 
national superannuation, opening up private discussions with the head of the TUC’s 
social insurance and industrial welfare committee and with individual unions.
42
 Three 
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aspects of national superannuation seemed to suggest that unions might be co-opted in 
opposing Labour’s plan. Firstly, pensions were effectively ‘deferred pay’ and 
traditionally viewed as part of conditions of work subject to collective bargaining 
between trade unions and employers. Secondly, as the life offices put it, the ‘socialist 
element of support of the low-paid workers by the higher-paid’ would operate to the 
detriment of the latter, many of whom were trade union members since they tended to 
work for larger concerns (which were more likely to offer company pensions) and to be 
better paid than other workers.
 43
 Thirdly, Labour proposed to require any schemes 
contracting out of national superannuation to offer benefits at least as good and, 
because it would be so expensive for company schemes to match these benefits, 
employers would be tempted to wind up their pension schemes and thus their workers 
risked a loss of benefits.
44
  
As we shall see, this direct lobbying of trade unionists and the indirect effects of the life 
offices’ public relations campaign were to shape trade union resistance to national 
superannuation, and before long newspapers across the political spectrum were 
highlighting TUC concerns.
45
 In September, the joint life offices began to distribute 
156,000 copies of a second booklet - a highly critical review of Labour’s national 
superannuation proposals.
46
 This highlighted the high degree of redistribution implied 
and emphasized the threat posed to eight million members of existing occupational 
schemes, and to the prospects of workers who could hope eventually to be in such 
schemes.  
This second booklet also warned that the proposed investment of the national 
superannuation fund in stock markets would result in ‘a sudden and severe shock to the 
economy’. In this, the life offices were working with the grain of widespread criticisms 
by Conservative ministers, by City spokesmen, and by many newspapers and journals, 
that national superannuation amounted to ‘nationalization by the back door’.47 This 
claim that national superannuation was a cover for a renewed round of nationalization 
by Labour was given credence by the simultaneous publication by the party of Industry 
and society. This, whilst it endorsed the relatively positive attitude towards the private 
sector of many Labour revisionists, still defended the principle of nationalization. Peter 
Baldwin notes that both Industry and society and National superannuation were 
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debated at the 1957 annual Labour conference, implying a link between the two, but 
that link was implicit rather than explicit.
48
 In fact evidence of linkages between the 
proposals is hard to find. Remarkably little thought appears to have been given to the 
investment strategy to be followed by the proposed national superannuation fund. Past 
commitments to a ‘national investment board’ (which had first appeared in the 1931 
Labour manifesto) were implicitly invoked but not explored in terms of 
implementation.
49
 Given the controversy over nationalization within the party this was 
likely deliberate. However, Labour’s failure to insulate the administration of the 
national superannuation fund from government control, its failure to think through how 
the fund would be invested, and to what ends, and its failure fully to clarify its thinking 
on nationalization gave credence to accusations that national superannuation would 
provide the funds for a renewed and extensive nationalization programme. In the 
context of low public support for further nationalization this was disastrous.
50
 By 
linking national superannuation to the issue of nationalization, therefore, the life offices 
and other critics went a long way towards discrediting it.  
At the same time, the joint life offices continued to wage a highly effective lobbying 
campaign aimed at defending occupational pension schemes and the considerable 
revenue they derived from them. In 1958, for example, they allocated a further £75,000 
to their advertising budget and Notley’s continued to place articles in the press, in the 
‘house magazines’ of occupational pension schemes and in women’s magazines, and to 
get the life offices’ case presented on a range of television and radio programmes.51 
Alongside this effort to mobilize public opinion to defend occupational pension 
schemes, the insurance industry also sought from the start to influence directly the 
development of policy by the Conservative government.  
Temperamentally, many Conservative ministers were in favour of a private sector 
solution.
52
 Indeed, the minister of pensions favoured expanding the private sector to 
provide occupational pensions for all workers.
53
 Publicly, the insurance industry 
seemed prepared to oblige.
54
 Privately, whilst it certainly wanted to expand, it knew 
that setting up occupational schemes for the large number of very small firms in the UK 
would be costly and unprofitable. Ultimately, therefore, some other solution must be 
found that would cover these workers (which the life offices publicly estimated to be 
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about ten per cent of the workforce, without doubt a considerable underestimate given 
the tone of their private discussions).
55
 The life offices’ aim was that any ‘state scheme 
should be small and should be kept small’ – providing minimal benefits that would 
meet the demand for earnings-related pensions for all whilst encouraging the continued 
growth of profitable private schemes that would be allowed to contract out of the state 
scheme.
56
 In a highly effective lobbying campaign, involving close cooperation with 
key ministers such as Iain Macleod, then minister of labour, the life industry was able 
to stymie an attempt by the prime minister, Harold Macmillan, to offer a generous state 
earnings-related scheme as a response to Labour’s electorally attractive proposals.57 
Instead, the basis of the government’s final legislation instituting a ‘graduated 
retirement pension’ was the Life Offices’ proposed ‘backstop’ scheme, with employers 
allowed to contract-out of by setting up their own scheme of equivalent or (more likely 
given the low level of benefits envisaged in the Conservatives’ plan) greater 
generosity.
58
  
Thus, the life offices through their public relations and lobbying campaign succeeded in 
both shaping to their advantage the government’s legislative response to Labour’s 
proposals and in mobilizing public opinion generally, and trade unionists in particular, 
against what they portrayed as an attack by Labour on occupational pension rights 
enjoyed by nearly nine million working people. At the same time, however, the 
insurance industry’s links with employers ensured the two interest groups worked 
together, and their mobilization of trade union opposition had a significant impact on 
Labour’s own crafting of its proposals for national superannuation. It is to this that we 
now turn. 
III  
When it came to employers, attitudes to Labour’s national insurance proposals were 
ambivalent. There was actually some support in industry for the idea of investing 
national insurance contributions in ‘productive industry’, so long as this was 
undertaken by a politically independent national insurance board, though there were 
doubts about whether independence could ever be assured.
59
 Employers’ objections 
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centred on two aspects of pension reform, whether carried out by Labour or by the 
Conservatives. Firstly, they were violently opposed to the idea that an employee should 
retain pension rights on a change of employment. The British Employers’ 
Confederation, for example, rejected the idea that such a loss of benefits restricted job 
mobility and dismissed the idea that employees should be regarded as acquiring some 
form of title to contributions made by an employer on their behalf to a pension 
scheme.
60
 At the heart of BEC objections, however, was the fact that loss of benefits on 
leaving employment before retirement both reduced the cost of providing company 
pensions and, crucially in the tight labour market of the time, helped to tie workers to 
their employer. Publicly employers vehemently denied that company pensions served to 
bind workers to their firms. Privately they acknowledged that they did, and that this 
was in fact a crucial part of many firms’ employment strategy. Ultimately, however, the 
BEC was forced to conclude that transferability must be conceded as ‘a political 
necessity’ given the degree of cross-party support for greater job mobility in the 
interests of economic growth.
61
 Nonetheless, given the importance of company 
pensions in securing the loyalty of workers, employers were keen to ensure that 
company pension schemes should be allowed to ‘contract out’ of any national scheme, 
and were to lobby the Conservative government hard to ensure contracting out was 
allowed on good terms.
62
 This aside, however, and despite their general agreement with 
John Boyd Carpenter’s stigmatization of national superannuation as a ‘castle in the air’, 
on the whole the employers were content to leave opposition to Labour’s pension plan 
to the pension funds, and to the unions.
63
  
On what basis was union opposition to national superannuation grounded? In the mid-
1950s, the TUC found itself in an increasingly difficult position over pensions. Since 
the 1930s, it had been committed to a universal welfare system of flat-rate contributions 
and benefits topped up from general taxation. Thus, Labour received short shrift when 
it first approached the TUC in 1953 with the idea of shifting Britain’s national 
insurance system to one in which contributions were linked to earnings.
64
 Later that 
year Labour once more approached the TUC, proposing a better state pension funded 
via an earnings-related social security tax, only to be rebuffed again.
65
 Increasingly, 
however, the TUC was finding its stance on pensions at odds with the patent 
inadequacy of the 1946 settlement. Increasingly, too, that stance was at odds with the 
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interests of the growing number of trade unionists who were members of occupational 
pension schemes.  
Historically, the TUC had opposed company pension schemes that it feared would 
divide the loyalties of employees between their firm and their union, and which it felt 
had the potential to subvert free collective bargaining by offering benefits outside its 
scope. By the mid-1950s, however, the TUC recognized that in this area the ground was 
shifting, but was all too aware that it lacked data that would allow it fully to understand 
the nature of the change. In 1956, therefore, it conducted a survey of member unions. 
To its surprise, though the response was not large, almost all those unions that replied 
were in favour of occupational pension provision.
66
 The TUC’s social insurance and 
industrial welfare committee, however, remained concerned about the potentially 
divisive implications of such a shift – fearing, for example, that the growing number of 
occupational pension scheme members might be used by the government as an excuse 
to shift away from a universal state pension towards targeting the scheme at those 
without such cover.
67
 
In 1955, the Labour Party had returned to the issue of pensions when Richard 
Crossman, impressed by Brian Abel-Smith and Peter Townsend’s recent Fabian 
pamphlet on pensions, persuaded Hugh Gaitskell to bring the two academics, along 
with their LSE colleague Richard Titmuss, into a new study group on security and old 
age that was tasked with formulating a new policy approach. The study group began by 
considering a memorandum from Abel-Smith proposing that the level of the state 
pension be improved via the introduction of a state earnings-related superannuation 
scheme.
68
 In a sense, therefore, the proposals set out in Abel-Smith’s memorandum 
might be seen as an attempt to forestall any attempt by the Conservatives radically to 
cut the scope of the state scheme by using the developing occupational pensions system 
to privatize a large section of pension provision. The proposal should also, however, be 
seen in the context of a developing appreciation amongst the LSE advisers in Labour’s 
study group (derided by the minister for pensions and national insurance as the ‘skiffle 
group’) of the problems posed for equality by the developing occupational pensions 
sector. Thus Abel-Smith’s memorandum sprang directly from a co-authored Fabian 
pamphlet with Peter Townsend on how to provide better pensions, but it also owed a 
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considerable debt to Titmuss’s analysis that tax subsidies to occupational schemes were 
costing the state £100m per annum (more than that spent on state pensions for the 
whole population) and that a combination of an inadequate state pension and the growth 
of occupational provision was creating a stratified pensions system, or ‘two-nations in 
retirement’.69  
The following year, Titmuss set out his argument that unless the country was prepared 
to ‘envisage a new, comprehensive, compulsory superannuation system’ based on 
differential contributions and benefits then the system must inevitably come to be 
dominated by occupational pension provision for those lucky enough to be members of 
such schemes, and by means-tested National Assistance for the rest.
70
 To avoid such an 
outcome, he proposed that after a transition period of about a decade Britain should 
move to a compulsory earnings-related ‘work pension for a working society’. 
Titmuss acknowledged that moving to such a system ‘bristle[d] with difficulties’, not 
least the issue of rights accrued by workers in company schemes. The most obvious 
solution, he argued, would be to nationalize the pension funds, but he hoped that this 
would effectively be accomplished by the construction of a state earnings-related 
scheme offering benefits that the private sector would find it impossible to match. This, 
he suggested, would lead many employers to ‘abandon, restrict, or curtail’ their 
schemes, setting in train a ‘long-term process of nationalization by attraction’.71 In 
short, Titmuss was proposing a direct, deliberate, and extensive assault on the 
‘investment and political power’ of the insurance industry in general, and of the 
pension funds in particular. 
However, Titmuss’s proposal also raised important issues for the TUC. Particularly 
problematic were the break with the flat-rate national insurance principle and the 
implications of a state earnings-related scheme for existing occupational schemes.
72
 As 
regards the former, senior Labour figures had already concluded that improvements to 
state pensions must acknowledge that the popular appetite for increased taxation was 
waning.
73
 The TUC, however, was equally adamant that it was not about to abandon the 
flat-rate principle, having reaffirmed it at Congress as recently as 1955.
74
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The means by which the TUC was brought to a compromise lay in Crossman’s 
recognition that opposition to the abandonment of the flat-rate approach could be 
avoided if national superannuation was implemented as a supplement to the national 
insurance pension rather than as its replacement.
75
 By September 1956 this ‘basic-plus’ 
approach had been accepted by the joint study group.
76
 A rearguard action was fought 
by the social insurance and industrial welfare committee of the TUC, but Hugh 
Gaitskell bluntly told the TUC that a commitment to the flat-rate approach must 
inevitably restrict what the party could do to improve the level of the pension.
77
 This 
put the TUC in a dilemma. The only means by which better pensions could be 
delivered, if one ruled out a rise in general taxation, appeared to be the institution of 
earnings-related contributions, but this would involve a fundamental break with TUC 
policy with ‘far-reaching social and economic implications’ that would need 
authorization by Congress.
78
 Nonetheless, with the Conservatives having used the 
Phillips Report definitively to rule out the raising of the national insurance pension to 
subsistence, and with Labour having decided that an adequate pension could not be 
delivered by the flat-rate system, the TUC was left with little choice but to agree to a 
basic-plus approach embodying earnings-related contributions for the supplementary 
element.
79
 The most it could do was to ensure the retention of the basic pension, the 
raising of its level to £3 from £2, and its indexation to the cost-of-living.  
Whilst Labour’s study group scored a victory over the TUC on earnings-relation,  it 
suffered a major and highly significant defeat on the issue of compulsion – fundamental 
both to the financial viability of national superannuation and to the future of 
occupational pension schemes (and also, of course, of very great importance to existing 
and prospective members of these schemes). For Titmuss, the sooner all workers were 
in the state superannuation scheme the better, since otherwise the ‘objectives of 
compulsory collective saving and the erosion of private insurance power would 
disappear’ from the proposals.80 If the elimination of private pension provision was 
central to the aims of Labour’s academic advisors, however, Labour politicians, despite 
support for compulsion from Aneurin Bevan, ultimately proved more pragmatic, 
recognizing the political price that would be paid if hard-won occupational pension 
rights were lost by workers.
81
 The blunt truth was that, with nearly nine million workers 
now covered by company pensions out of a workforce of around 22 million and with 
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union density at 43.9 per cent, Titmuss’s proposals amounted to an assault not just on 
the insurance industry but on the pension benefits of many of the nation’s 9.8 million 
unionized workers (notably better-paid workers in contributory schemes, such as 
miners, and any worker in a non-contributory scheme which, as public sector unions 
pointed out to the TUC, included 650,000 civil servants, plus another 400,000 industrial 
civil servants).
82
 This fact was not lost on the TUC’s social insurance and industrial 
welfare committee. 
A meeting of Labour’s home policy committee on 4 March 1957 considered the options 
and, in the process, identified some of the objections. At this stage, Labour’s plan 
involved compulsorily enrolling into the new national superannuation scheme all new 
entrants to the labour market (with the hope that existing members would be brought in 
relatively rapidly by the process of ‘attraction’ that Titmuss thought the scheme’s 
superior benefits would set off).
83
 For the TUC, this raised two fundamental problems. 
Firstly, having new workers enrolled into National Superannuation whilst existing 
workers remained in the company scheme would create different conditions for workers 
doing the same job, something trade unions had traditionally staunchly resisted. 
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, cutting off the supply of new entrants 
threatened the financial viability of occupational schemes. The TUC made plain its 
dissatisfaction.
84
 Douglas Houghton, then a member of the TUC’s general council, 
warned Crossman that as it stood the plan would be opposed by highly organized public 
sector unions. ‘There is a very powerful pressure group here!’ counselled Houghton.85  
For the architects of national superannuation, however, TUC resistance to compulsion 
was a major problem. The brutal truth, set out for Crossman in a devastating note by the 
Co-operative movement’s consulting actuary, was that without compulsion 
redistribution within the national superannuation scheme would lead to ‘almost 
universal contracting out’ by higher-paid workers of all ages, and by moderately paid 
younger workers.
86
 Contracting out would therefore precipitate the loss of exactly the 
contributions that were most vital to the scheme’s financial viability and its 
redistributory aims. As the study group warned the TUC, ‘Only if extensive number of 
‘white-collared’ workers were brought into [national superannuation] could the 
attractive benefits for manual and lower paid workers be financed’.87 But whilst this 
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‘satisfied a principal socialist objective by reducing inequalities’, compelling better 
paid workers to join a redistributive national superannuation scheme would almost 
inevitably make them worse off if they were already in (or had reasonable hopes of 
being in) a company pension scheme – a point being hammered home to them by the 
Life Offices in their advertising and in their booklets aimed at occupational scheme 
members, many of them trade unionists. Moreover, the TUC social insurance 
committee feared the loss of new entrants would make many existing occupational 
schemes actuarially ‘unsound’. This would ‘break’ the system for it would lead such 
schemes inevitably to ‘wither away’, to the detriment of their trade union members.88 
The result was that the TUC was in no mood to accept compulsion. 
Essentially, therefore, the TUC analysis was identical to that of the City: Labour’s 
proposals as they stood would herald the nationalization of the insurance industry. This 
was not just a matter of occupational pension scheme members losing accrued rights, or 
of trade union members  being excluded from company pension schemes, whether 
either entering the labour market or changing jobs, serious though that obviously was; 
there would also be job losses in the insurance industry that would be opposed by the 
insurance unions. Privately, members of the social insurance committee felt they were 
being bounced by Labour on an issue that was fundamental to the financial viability of 
national superannuation, but one which ‘raised complex issues of very great importance 
to the trade union movement’.89 Although the TUC general council agreed to continue 
guarded discussions with Labour on national superannuation, keeping in mind the 
impact on existing schemes whose future ‘depended on the intake of new members’, its 
general secretary made it clear to his opposite number in the Labour Party that 
compelling new entrants to join national superannuation would be ‘a mistake’.90 By the 
end of April the compulsory enrolment of new workers into the new scheme had 
disappeared from the draft of National superannuation.
91
 
This back-tracking by Labour had been required by the TUC’s insistence that further 
consideration must be given to the whole question of existing schemes. Its strategy was 
to widen the discussion via a series of open regional meetings and to negotiate hard 
with Labour on the exact conditions under which occupational schemes would be 
allowed to contract out of national superannuation.
92
 This was not without effect. By 
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July, the Association of Superannuation and Pension Funds came away from a meeting 
with Crossman reassured that ‘it was appreciated that without new blood a private 
scheme could not be maintained and that the matter would receive further 
consideration’.93 In September, Labour’s pension plan was debated at the TUC 
conference. Alf Roberts, chairman of the social insurance committee, denied that a rift 
had developed between the TUC and the Labour Party over the proposals (few can have 
believed him). But he made it clear that Congress was not being asked to endorse the 
detail of the proposals, merely ‘to endorse the general council’s opinion that the new 
scheme was sufficiently attractive to justify further examination’.94 This was hardly a 
ringing endorsement. Rhetorically, the debate suggested support for better pensions for 
the low paid, and for existing pensioners (not least from representatives of unskilled 
workers such as agricultural workers). However, Alf Roberts, opening the discussion 
for the General Council, was careful to confront the potential impact of National 
Superannuation on the many trade unionists already in superannuation schemes (which 
he acknowledged was an issue of ‘fundamental importance’), and to do so in the 
context of the opt-out that the TUC had obtained for such schemes.   
In fact, at the Labour Party conference in October, at which the national superannuation 
plan was unanimously endorsed, Crossman responded to complaints that earnings-
related pensions were incompatible with socialism by indicating that the plan might in 
fact be ‘too socialist’ (i.e. too redistributive) for better-paid workers.95 He was careful 
to reassure his audience that occupational pension schemes that could pass ‘certain 
tests’ (the major one being transferability) would continue to operate and promised to 
consult further on the TUC’s ‘grave anxieties’ that ‘sucking away new entrants will 
injure these schemes’. 
On the basis of the reception given to the proposals at the TUC conference, the Life 
Office’s determined that the industry might now profitably discuss the issue directly 
with selected union leaders.
96
 They discovered them to be ‘particularly anxious to 
protect the accrued pension benefits of their members’ in company schemes.97 By 
November,  the conference of the Association of Superannuation and Pension Funds 
was confident that unions would act to defend their members’ company pensions, 
having come to see Labour’s proposals as likely ‘to fill in the gaps that are there still 
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are in this world of private funds’ rather than to replace them.98 Nine months later, the 
British Employers’ Confederation was actually worried that the compromises made by 
Labour on National Superannuation in terms of the ability to select against the scheme 
might be such as to generate a backlash within the party.
99
 
However, allowing new entrants as well as existing workers to contract-out of national 
superannuation left Labour with a significant problem. As Tony Lynes, then a Labour 
Party researcher, noted, ‘whatever words we may use to conceal the fact, it [was now] 
essentially a pay-as-you-go scheme’ and one which in actuarial terms gave ‘absurdly 
good value for money’.100 If National superannuation’s revenue and expenditure 
projections had been for a period greater than twenty years this would have been 
painfully apparent. Moreover, having conceded the principle of contracting-out for all, 
Labour was then left with the problem that occupational pension schemes could not be 
expected to compete with the dynamism of pensions in payment offered by national 
superannuation since this ‘would make the concept of actuarial soundness quite 
meaningless’.101 In June 1959, the study group confronted the problem. Drawing on the 
work of the Co-op’s consulting actuary, and on informal meetings with the Institute of 
Actuaries, it decided that the only way in which contracting out could be achieved was 
to remove dynamisation from the earnings-related portion of the pension and apply it to 
the basic pension instead.
102
 Thus the attractions of the national superannuation scheme 
were significantly downgraded and the relative attractions of private occupational 
schemes increased, with all that that implied for the likely rate at which occupational 
pension provision would continue to grow. All Labour could do was hope that ‘rigorous 
enforcement’ of the conditions for contracting-out would serve to reduce somewhat the 
inevitable outflow of higher-paid workers. 
IV 
Labour’s proposals for national superannuation were an  attempt to deal with the 
increasing inadequacy of British pensions and to eliminate the ‘two nations in 
retirement’ that was increasingly evident as those dependent on state pensions fell 
behind those with occupational pensions. In addition, National Superannuation had the 
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potential to generate enormous amounts of money that might be used to modernize the 
British economy. It also represented a deliberate and determined assault by the 
scheme’s academic architects on the power of the insurance industry. By extension, 
however, it also threatened the pension rights of workers with company pensions, many 
of them trade union members. This article has shown that resistance to the proposed 
scheme by the life offices and the trade unions played an important short-term role in 
discrediting Labour’s proposal and rolling back some of its key elements. But it is the 
long-term significance of their actions that is most significant, for their resistance 
played an important part in ensuring that occupational pension provision would 
continue to expand, that the power of the pension funds would continue to grow, and 
that the potential to fund a ‘developmental state’ would not be realized. 
The insurance industry waged a public relations campaign that is striking both in the 
financial resources devoted to it, and in the sophisticated way in which it sought to 
influence public opinion against specific elements of the national superannuation 
proposals. As part of this campaign, it effectively linked in the minds of voters the 
concept of national superannuation with fears that Labour was planning to use its funds 
to finance a new round of politically unpopular nationalization. It also sought 
successfully to mobilize occupational pension scheme members (and their trade unions) 
against the compulsory enrolment of workers in the national superannuation scheme. In 
doing so, it managed not just to ensure the continuation of occupational pensions in 
Britain but, by effectively ensuring that workers with above-average earnings would 
continue to be financially better off in occupational schemes, ensured the continued 
rapid growth of the latter.  
Likewise, the decisions on contracting out that were forced by the unions on Labour 
helped to ensure the continued expansion of occupational pensions, not to mention the 
power of the pension funds. They also had significant implications for the scheme’s 
financing, serving to weaken its economic viability. National superannuation estimated 
that only a quarter of workers would remain in private schemes – highly optimistic 
given that a third of workers, many of them higher-earners and thus likely to select 
against membership of the state scheme, were already in occupational schemes.
103
 This 
underestimation produced overly optimistic assumptions about the scheme’s revenue, 
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and about the likely savings in tax subsidies to occupational pension schemes.
104
 In 
short, the decision to allow contracting out by all workers did not just favour 
occupational schemes, it also made the claim that national superannuation would be a 
‘funded’ scheme for the long-term a hollow one, though this was not immediately 
apparent in financial projections that covered only the first twenty ‘happy years’ in 
which revenue would exceed expenditure.
105
 
We thus see in the late-1950s an alliance of capital (in the shape of the life offices) and 
labour against national superannuation. This is not to say that the unions were as one, 
though the TUC did come to oppose the scheme. Nor is it so say that the resistance of 
these unlikely allies to specific elements of Labour’s proposals was co-ordinated, 
though the insurance industry did expend considerable effort on seeking to influence 
the opinions of both leaders and members of trade unions. But Labour fatally 
misjudged these two groups’ unity of interest in both preserving and expanding the role 
of occupational pension savings in Britain’s overall system of income replacement in 
old age. In conjunction, the actions of capital and labour served to discredit and to 
distort Labour’s conception of earnings-related pensions. Their separate campaigns also 
helped to ensure that it would be the Conservatives not Labour that would shape the 
landscape of British pensions over the next two decades. In doing so, they helped to 
embed private pensions, to guarantee an expansion in their scope, to ensure the 
continued growth in the financial power of the pension funds, and thus ultimately to 
secure a major role for the private sector in British pension provision, and a major role 
for pension capitalism in Britain. Within a decade, more than half the workforce was in 
a company pension scheme. The result, ironically, was thus the perpetuation of exactly 
the ‘two nations in retirement’ that the architects of national superannuation sought to 
eradicate.
106
  
At the same time, a scheme that might have generated the revenue for the 
modernization of Britain by an active state prepared to intervene widely in investment 
decisions – something both major parties separately identified as a key part of their 
respective policy programmes in the early- to mid-1960s – came to naught. National 
superannuation had the potential to emulate the Swedish ‘Meidner plan’ of the late-
1970s in which wage rises ‘foregone’ by workers were to be used to build up 
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collectively owned ‘wage-earner funds’ that would invest in domestic firms.107 
Blackburn sees the Meidner plan as torpedoed by ‘bourgeois interests’, but a more 
subtle view is that robust opposition from the Swedish Employers’ Federation in 
conjunction with white-collar union members, aided by the SAP’s loss of the 1976 
election, led to a major dilution of the proposals that meant that, once introduced in 
1983, ‘their investment decisions were largely indistinguishable from those of capitalist 
investment funds.’108 In Britain, we see a similar pattern, but with finance capital rather 
than the employers allying with trade unionists, and a more decisive failure to attain the 
objective of socialized investment.  
In the absence of investment capital over which the state could exercise control, 
government attempts to modernize the private sector of the economy in the 1960s 
necessarily fell back on ‘indicative planning’ with firms encouraged to increase 
investment with capital raised via traditional means: retained profits, bank overdrafts, 
and equity markets in which the government had no influence and which inevitably 
took no particular interest in the long-term needs of the British economy. This article 
makes no judgment about the respective merits of collective and private control of 
investment capital but it has shown that by 1959 the former was effectively off the 
agenda. By 1967, contributions to occupational pension schemes amounted to £1.25 
billion per annum and the net worth of their funds was rising by £810m per annum.
109
 
By 1979, pension funds were managing assets worth £20 billion – nearly a third of the 
market capitalization of all UK and Irish equities.
110
 Pension fund capitalism, it seemed, 
was here to stay.
111
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